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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of Case. 
This case involves a claim for damages from trespass due to the construction and 
expansion of a road located, in part, along the boundary line of real property owned by 
Respondent Mueller and property owned by Appellant Hill. After a three day bench trial, the 
District Court found that the Appellants Hill, Keys, Thompson and Northwest Shelter Systems 
(referred to herein collectively as "Appellants") trespassed upon and damaged Respondent 
Duane Mueller's real property through the blasting of a hillside, the construction/expansion of 
the driveway, and the diversion of water onto Mueller's property. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 923-926). The 
District Court issued Judgment to Mueller inclusive of damages in the amount of $23,500.00, 
and costs and fees of $55,164.40, for a total Judgment of $78,664.40. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 1018-
1020). 
B. The Course of the Proceedings. 
Respondent Mueller filed the underlying Complaint against the Appellants in Bonner 
County District Court on September 28, 2010, asserting a cause of action for trespass, and 
alleging that his property had been damaged from the actions of the Appellants. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 
42-48). The Appellants submitted their Answer on May 19, 2011, asserting counter-claims for 
an easement over, or fee title to the road, as well as damages caused from an allegedly shot dog. 
(R., Vol. 1, pp. 61-72) 
Mueller amended his Complaint on May 19, 2011, and again on January 31, 2012. (R., 
Vol. 1, p. 111-118; Vol. 2, pp. 352-360). Defendant Buck was subsequently dismissed upon 
settlement. (R., Vol. 4, pp. 648-649). 
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The matter proceeded to a three day bench trial on March 25, 26, and 27, 2013. Post trial 
arguments were submitted in ,vriting, and the Court conducted a view of the subject properties 
on April 12, 2013. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 870-911). 
The Court entered its Memorandum Decision on June 5, 2013, finding that the Appellants 
had committed trespass in 2008 with the blasting of the hillside and the widening of the road, as 
well as in 2011 with the removal of Mueller's no trespassing signs and fence posts, and the 
unauthorized entry and work on Mueller's property. (R., Vol. 5, p. 923-937). The District Court 
also found that the diversion of water runoff from the Appellant's property to the Mueller 
Property constituted a continuing trespass. (R., Vol. 5, p. 931 ). The District Court awarded to 
Mueller damages in the amount of $23,300, plus attorneys fees and costs of $55,164.40 for a 
total award of$78,664.40 against the Appellants. (R., Vol. 5, p. 1007-1017). The Court issued a 
Judgment on September 6, 2013, in the sum of$78,664.40. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 1018-1020). 
The Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on September 26, 2013 (R., Vol. 5, pp. 1021-
1024), and an Amended Notice of Appeal on October 10, 2013. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 1027-1030). 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. In 1989, Plaintiff Duane Mueller acquired two parcels of real property in Bonner 
County, in joint ownership with Jessie Sossman, who later became his wife. (Ex. 1; Tr., Vol. 1, 
p. 34, L. 3-10). 
2. Mueller's home is located on his Northern parcel, which is located to the North of 
Elmira Road, which is a public road. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 28-30). 
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3. This matter involves Mueller's southern parcel, which is located to the South of 
Elmira Road, and on which is located a barn, but no home (hereinafter the "Mueller Property"). 
(Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 52-53). 
4. Mueller uses this Southern parcel to cultivate hay. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 54, L. 2-5). 
5. Duane Mueller and Jesse Sossman Mueller were divorced on August 25, 2008. 
(Ex. 4). Duane Mueller was awarded the parcel and residence located to the north of Elmira 
Road. Jessie was awarded the southern 20 acre parcel at issue in this case. (R., Vol. 5, p. 926,, 
9; Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 48-50). Duane Mueller executed a quitclaim deed in favor of Jesse on 
September 6, 2008. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 49-50). 
6. Although Duane Mueller conveyed his interest in the southern parcel to Jesse 
Mueller per the Decree of Divorce, at the time of the divorce Jesse agreed to sell to Duane the 
property for $120,000 within one year from the divorce. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 51, L. 9-15). 
7. Pursuant to the agreement between Duane and Jesse Mueller, Duane Mueller 
continued to possess and use the property while he worked on obtaining financing. (Tr., Vol. 1, 
pp. 51-54). 
8. On July 17, 2009, Jessie Mueller executed a warranty deed, which conveyed the 
property back to Duane Mueller. (Ex. 3) 
9. In 1995, Ray and Carol Thompson, the parents of Appellants Carolyn Hill and 
Kevin Thompson, bought an "L" shaped 32 acres parcel of land located immediately to the east 
of the Mueller property. (R., Vol. 5, p. 924, , 2). 
10. On September 13, 2004, Appellant Carolyn Hill bought the 32 acres parcel from 
her parents. (R., Vol. 5, p. 925, 15; Ex. 6). 
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11. In 2005, Hill sold the southernmost 20 acres of her property to David and Susan 
Mench. (R., Vol. 5, p. 925,, 5; Ex. 7). 
12. In July of 2008, the Menches sold the property to her brother Kevin Thompson 
and his wife, Philomena Keys. (R., Vol. 5, p. 925,, 6; Ex. 8). 
13. Hill allows Thompson and Keys to access their property through the property that 
Hill still owns. (R., Vol. 5, p. 925, , 6). 
14. The relative locations of these parcels are depicted as follows: 
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(Ex. 14-D). 
15. Defendant Northwest Shelter Systems, LLC, is owned by the Defendants 
Thompson and Keys, with its principal place of business located at the Keys/Thompson property. 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 514, L. 20-25). 
16. In August 2008, the Defendants began to perform work on a road which crosses 
through Hill's property, and accesses the Keys/Thompson parcel. (R., Vol. 5, p. 926, 18). 
17. This access road is located in part along the boundary line of the Mueller property, 
which is located on a steep hillside which slants do\\11ward towards the Mueller property from 
the Hill property. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 47, L. 8-22). 
18. As part of the construction of the road, the Appellants hired Defendant Jeff Buck 
and Bucks Construction, LLC, who conducted blasting on the Hill property facing Mueller's 
property, causing rock and debris to be projected onto the Mueller Property, causing further 
damage and destruction to Mueller's trees from flying rocks. (R., Vol. 5, p. 926, 110). 
19. Rocks and debris landed in Mueller's hay field, littering the field with large rocks, 
resulting in damages to haying equipment and the inability to harvest a portion of Mueller's 
hayfield. (Id.). 
20. The Appellants also hired Woods Crushing and Hauling, which used a bulldozer to 
push large amounts of dirt, rock and debris over the side of the road onto Mueller's property. (R., 
Vol. 5, p. 926,111, p. 931). 
21. These construction activities caused the diversion of a substantial amount of water 
runoff onto Mueller's property, saturating part of his hay field. (R., Vol. 5, p. 926, 1 11; Tr., 
Vol. 1, p. 74, L. 12-16; p.74, L. 1-2). 
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22. Mueller subsequently had his property surveyed, confirming the trespass, and 
marked the boundary line with stakes and no trespassing signs. (R., Vol. 5, p. 926-927, ,i 12; Tr., 
Vol. 1, pp. 64-65, 76, L. 7-23). 
23. Mueller then brought his lawsuit, and the Defendant counterclaimed for 
ownership, or an easement over, the entirety of the road. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 42-48, 61-72) 
24. Despite the ongoing litigation, and existence of the no trespassing signs, in 2011 
the Appellant Kevin Thompson removed Mueller's no trespassing signs and surveyed boundary 
stakes, and instructed Woods Crushing and Hauling to enter upon the Muller property and 
excavate materials, without Mueller's permission. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 110-1011, 1014; Tr., Vol. 1, p. 
531, L. 4-24). 
25. At the behest of Appellant Thompson, Wood Crushing & Hauling trespassed upon 
the Mueller property, and excavated a portion of Mueller's property. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 926, 1010-
1011; Tr., Vol. 1, p. 531, L. 4-24). 
26. As the Appellants admitted and the District Court found, Defendant Kevin 
Thompson was acting on behalf of himself, and the other Appellants, as to all of the underlying 
events. (R. Vol. 1, p. 67, ,i 8; R. Vol. 3, pp. 533, ,i 11; R., Vol. 5, P. 927, ,i 16; Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 
503). 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
On appeal, the appellate Court will set aside findings of fact only upon a finding that they 
are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P 52(a). Appellate review of the decision of the trial court is limited 
to ascertaining whether substantial, competent evidence supports the findings of fact and whether 
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the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Crea v. Crea, 135 Idaho 246, 16 P.3d 922 
(2000); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). 
The standard of review that this court employs when considering an appeal from a trial 
court acting as fact-finder is stated in Lettunich v. Lettunich: 
When we consider an appeal from a district court sitting as the fact 
finder, we do so through our abuse-of-discretion [lens]; that is, we 
examine whether the trial court (1) rightly perceived the issues as 
ones of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that 
discretion and appropriately applied the legal principles to the facts 
found; and (3) reached its decision through an exercise of reason. 
Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Pmver Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 
803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). In conducting our review, we liberally 
construe the district court's findings in favor of the judgment. Ervin 
Constr. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 699, 874 P.2d 506, 510 
(1993). We will not disturb a district court's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous. A court's findings of fact are not clearly 
erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent, 
though conflicting, evidence. Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc. 
v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 794 P .2d 1389 ( 1990); 
kfurgoitio v. lvfurgoitio, 111 Idaho 573, 576, 726 P.2d 685, 688 
(1986); I.R.C.P. 52(a). 
141 Idaho 425,429, 111 P.3d 110, 114 (2005). 
"This Court will not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court." Justad v. 
Ward, 147 Idaho 509,511,211 P.3d 118, 120 (2009). "Questions of credibility and the weight of 
the evidence are matters uniquely within the province of the trial court." Treasure Valley 
Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Earth Res. Co., 115 Idaho 373, 376, 766 P.2d 1254, 1257 
(Ct.App.1988). "The findings of the trial court on the question of damages will not be set aside 
when based upon substantial and competent evidence." Akers v. ,Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 43-
44, 205 P.3d 1175, 1179-80 (2009). 
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B. The District Court Properly Found that Mueller Has Standing to Seek an Award 
of Damages. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the District Court found that Duane Mueller had standing 
to seek an award of damages caused by the Appellants' acts of trespass. The Appellants contend 
that the Court erred in this regard, asserting that Mueller did not own the property at the time of 
the trespass. (App. Brief, pp. 16-18). The Appellants are mistaken, both as to the underlying 
evidence admitted at trial, and as to their assertion that the District Court's determination is 
legally erroneous. 
1. The Trespass Began While Afueller was a Titled Owner of the Property. 
The District Court found that Appellant Thompson began work on the driveway "in 
August of 2008." (R. Vol. 5, p. 926, ~ 8). Mueller was not divorced until August 25, 2008, and 
the property was not conveyed by quitclaim deed until September 6, 2008. (R. Vol. 5, p. 926, 1 
9). 
The Appellants erroneously contend that "[t]he road improvements commenced with 
Wood's Crushing and Hauling dozer work, which had invoices dated September 3, 2008 and 
October 15, 2008." (App. Brief, p. 15) (emphasis added). The Appellant fails to provide a 
citation to the record for the contention that the road work began with the Wood's Crushing and 
Hauling work, and, in fact, this statement contradicts both the District Court's findings, and the 
evidence admitted at trial. The Court did not find that the road work commenced only after 
Mueller's divorce. Rather, the Court found that "Kevin [Thompson] began work on the 
driveway in August, 2008." (R. Vol. 5, p. 926, 1 8). Mueller, however, was not divorced until 
August 25, 2014, and by that time, the trespass was well underway. 
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Notably, the Appellants fail to cite to any evidence proving the road work began after 
Mueller's divorce. In fact, the evidence at trial demonstrated that Kevin Thompson himself, as 
well as his brother Alan Thompson, had been operating heavy equipment and performing work 
on the Hill parcel prior to the work performed by Woods, and even prior to Thompson acquiring 
ownership of the Keys/Thompson Parcel. 
Gene Weathers, the owner of the parcel of property located to the East of the Hall parcel, 
testified that he saw both Kevin Thompson and Alan Thompson operating heavy equipment 
upon the Hill property in the spring of 2008, and that rocks and debris were blasted and 
bulldozed onto his property as well. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 591-592, 595-596). Weathers confronted 
Thompson in June or July 2008, at which time Thompson promised to clean up the trespassing 
debris, and gave to Weathers a business card indicating that Thompson was acting on behalf of 
Appellant Northwest Shelter Systems, LLC. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 595-598; Ex. 76). This card was 
admitted at trial, thereby corroborating Weather's testimony. (Ex. 76). Weathers further 
testified that he sought legal counsel three to four months after confronting Thompson, because 
Thompson had failed to remove the debris on Weathers' property. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 600, L. 14-21). 
Weathers' further testified that his lawyer sent a letter to Thompson dated September 17, 2008, 
demanding the removal of the debris from Weathers' property. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 599-600). This 
proves that Thompson was performing road work on the Hill Property months prior to Mueller's 
divorce. 
Moreover, Duane Mueller testified that he first noticed work being done on the road as 
far back as May, 2008. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 58). Witness Alan Palaniuk testified that he witnessed 
the road work in the spring of 2008. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 434-435). George Thompson (no relation to 
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Kevin Thompson), who was he Woods Crushing and Hauling employee who performed the 
bulldozer work, testified that he personally witnessed Kevin Thompson and/or Philomena Keys 
at the property operating a "cat" and "<loin' some work." (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 573, L. 12-21). Thus, 
although the evidence is conflicting as to when the road work began, the District Court's finding 
is supported by substantial evidence. Sun Valley Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 
118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990) (A trial court's findings and conclusions which 
are based on substantial, although conflicting, evidence will not be disturbed on appeal.). 
2. Even Ajier the Divorce, l1Jueller Retained an Equitable Interest in the 
Property; Therefore, he has Standing to Seek an Award a/Damages. 
In addition to being mistaken as to when the trespass commenced, the Appellants' 
contention that Mueller lacks standing is legally erroneous, because it disregards Mueller's 
equitable interest in the property during the brief time period between his divorce, and his 
reacquisition of the property by express conveyance from Jesse Mueller. 
At trial, Mueller testified that he and Jessie Mueller had entered into an agreement 
whereby Mueller had agreed that he would purchase the property from Jessie Mueller within one 
year of the divorce in exchange of payment of $120,000.00 to Jessie Mueller. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 51, 
L. 9-13 ). This testimony was not refuted. Mueller further testified that he immediately began 
the process of obtaining financing for the purchase of the property, and continued to access and 
use the property as his own. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 52-54). This included keeping and grazing his horses 
on the property, keeping his equipment and hay in the barn, growing hay on the property, and 
asserting ownership rights when he discovered that the Defendants' road construction activities 
had caused material to be placed on the property. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 52-54, 60-61). Mueller did, 
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ultimately, acquire fee simple ownership of the property by warranty deed from Jessie Mueller 
on July 17, 2009. (Ex. 3). 
Because Duane Mueller had an agreement to purchase the property from Jessie Mueller, 
as evidenced not only by Mueller's unrefuted testimony, but also by his continued possession 
and use of the property, he had an equitable ownership interest in the property, and therefore has 
standing to bring a claim for any damages inflicted upon the property during the time between 
his divorce, and the conveyance by Jesse Mueller to Duane Mueller. Rush v. Anestos, 104 Idaho 
630, 634, 661 P.2d 1229, 1233 (1983) ("'An equitable conversion takes place when parties enter 
into a binding contract for the purchase and sale of realty. The purchaser is deemed the equitable 
owner thereof, and the seller is the owner of the purchase price."). 
The Appellants' only argument with regard to Mueller's equitable interest in the property 
is to assert that Duane Mueller's agreement to purchase the property from Jessie Mueller was 
unenforceable under Idaho's statute of frauds, Idaho Code § 9-505. (App. Brief, p. 17). 
However, because Mueller indisputably performed under the agreement i.e. purchased the 
property from Jesse Mueller within one year for $120,000 the statute of frauds does not, by its 
express terms, defeat the agreement. As explained by this Court in Brown v. Burnside, 94 Idaho 
363,365,487 P.2d 957,959 (1971) (emphasis added): 
The Idaho statute of frauds, LC. s 9-503, requires a transfer of real 
property to be in writing. However, the statute does not apply 
when ... there has been partial or complete performance. LC. 
§ 9-504; Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 480 P.2d 896 (1971); 
Quayle v. A1ackert, 92 Idaho 563, 447 P.2d 679 (1968); McMahon 
v. Auger, 83 Idaho 27, 357 P.2d 374 (1960); Anselmo v. 
Beardmore, 70 Idaho 392,219 P.2d 946 (1950). 
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Moreover, the lack of a writing evidencing the agreement to purchase the property is not 
fatal to Mueller's equitable ownership of the property, because the party asserting the equitable 
ownership need only show that the title was ultimately perfected, as Mueller has done in this 
case. 
Generally, an equitable conversion takes place when a real estate 
contract becomes binding on the parties. The buyer then has an 
interest in the property. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, Nat. Ass'n v. 
Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429 P.2d 386 (1967). Title to real property 
subject to an executory contract may be defective at the time of 
contracting. Title need only be perfected upon the completion of 
performance. See Jensen v. Bledsoe, 100 Idaho 84, 593 P.2d 988 
(1975); i\;fetzker v. Lowther, 69 Idaho 155,204 P.2d 1025 (1949). 
Carter v. Rich, 111 [daho 684,687, 726 P.2d 1135, 1138 (1986) (emphasis added). 
Although Mueller's interest in the subject property was conveyed to Jessie Mueller at the 
time of their divorce, Mueller's agreement to repurchase the property within one year vested 
with him an equitable interest in the property, which was perfected upon his performance under 
that agreement. The Appellants cannot, therefore, escape liability for their trespass by hiding 
behind the fact of Mueller's divorce. 
C. The District Court's Finding of Trespass is Supported by Substantial Evidence. 
Appellant assigns error to the District Court's finding that a statutory trespass under 
Idaho Code§ 6-202 occurred in 2011. The District Court found: 
The second trespass, in the summer of 2011, was clearly willful 
and intentional. The property line had been surveyed and the 
boundary line was marked with posts and a string line along with 
"No Trespassing" signs. This lawsuit had been filed and the initial 
trial date was approaching. [Thompson] hired Woods Crushing and 
Hauling to enter onto the Mueller property in violation of the "No 
Trespassing" signs in an apparent attempt to mitigate damages and 
return the property to its pre-2008 condition. 
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(R., Vol. 5, p. 1010-101 l)(internal citations omitted). 
These findings are supported by substantial evidence admitted at trial. In 2011, a mere 
three weeks before the then scheduled trial, Appellant Thompson, by his own admission, 
removed Mueller's stakes and no trespassing signs, and instructed Woods Crushing and Hauling 
to dig up Mueller's property, which the Appellants allege constituted "appropriate self-help." 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 531; R. Vol. 5, p. 907). Idaho law, however, does not distinguish between what 
would be subjectively "appropriate self-help" in a boundary line dispute, and "inappropriate self-
help." Rather, this Court has categorically condemned self-help by any individual who finds 
himself in a property dispute: 
This Court strongly disfavors the resort to forceful self-help in 
resolving property disputes. See Burke v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am., No. 02C5910, 2004 WL 784073, at *4 (N.D.III. Jan. 29, 
2004) ("Self-help in litigation is not condoned by the courts."); 
Doles v. Doles, No. 17462, 2000 WL 511693, at *2 (Va.Cir.Ct. 
Mar. 10, 2000) ("[P]ublic policy favors the settlement of disputes 
by litigation rather than by self help force ... "). When parties have 
entered into a conflict over real property the rights are usually 
fixed far in advance of the exchange of attorneys' letters, or 
subsequent filing of a lawsuit, motions, depositions, and hearings. 
Making a bold physical attempt to gain, or regain, possession or 
control of a real property interest, by demolishing or erecting gates 
or fences, bulldozing land, etc., results in no strategic advantage. 
Instead, passions become inflamed, positions become entrenched, 
damages are exacerbated rather than mitigated, and the parties end 
up spending far more money in litigation than their supposed 
interest was worth to begin with. Attorneys who counsel their 
clients to engage in self-help, without being certain that the 
respective rights and responsibilities have been settled, do their 
clients a disservice. Clients who ignore the advice of counsel 
and take matters into their own hands do themselves a 
disservice. In short, parties who attempt to solve a property 
dispute through their own forceful action do so at their own 
peril. 
Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851,864,230 P.3d 743, 756 (2010) (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, the Appellants' assertion that their actions do not constitute a trespass is 
refuted by the evidence admitted at trial. In fact, prior to removing Mueller's no trespassing 
signs and survey markers, and instructing Woods Crushing & Hauling to perform additional 
work on Mueller's property, counsel of the Appellants had specifically asked permission to take 
such actions in a letter sent to Mueller's attorney. (Ex. 70). Mueller, through his attorney, 
indicated that Mueller might be amenable to such an approach, but only under the following 
restrictions: 
(Ex. 49). 
If your client is willing to remove the material, my client will only 
allow it under the following circumstances: 
1. The Defendants hire a licensed contractor to do all work; 
2. The contractor or the Defendants submit their plan for 
removal of the material, disposal of the material, providing 
adequate retention for the road base (with actual "toe" beginning 
on the Defendants property), the slope degree, drainage plan, and 
hydroseeding plan to Mr. Mueller for approval; 
3. The Army Corp of Engineers and EPA issue permits for the 
work; 
4. A certified arborist be on site for all relevant work to make 
sure no further damage is done to Mr. Mueller's trees; and 
5. All material on Mr. Mueller's side of the surveyed 
boundary line (not the old bulldozer road) be removed. 
The Appellants, however, ignored these reasonable requests and without permission or 
warning willfully and intentionally removed the surveyed posts and no trespassing signs and 
intruded upon Mueller's property. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 1014; Tr., Vol. 1, p. 531, L. 4-24). The 
timing of these actions is an important factor, in that the Appellants essentially tampered with 
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evidence just prior to trial, thereby requiring a continuance of trial, and causing Mueller to incur 
additional attorney's fees and expert witness costs. Under these circumstances, such actions 
cannot be considered "appropriate self-help," and is exactly the type of conduct that this Court 
warned against in its Weitz v. Green decision. 
Finally, the Appellants contend that there is no evidence in the record supporting the 
District Court's finding of common law trespass, because there was no finding that there was 
"interference with the right of exclusive possession of the land." (App. Brief, p. 20). The 
Appellants cite to A1ock v. Potlatch Corp., 786 F. Supp. 1545, 1548 (D. Idaho 1992) in support 
of this contention. In the Mock decision, however, the United Stated District Court clearly 
explains that an interference with a property owner's right of possession includes causing 
another to enter upon the land: 
Generally, an interference with the exclusive right of possession 
involves an entry onto the land. An entry may take the form of the 
defendant personally intruding on the land, causing another to 
intrude upon the land, or causing some tangible thing to intrude 
upon the land. See Restatement (Second) a/Torts§ 158(a) (1965). 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that in 2011, the Appellants removed Mueller's stakes and signs, and at 
Thompson's behest, Woods Crushing and Hauling employees entered upon Mueller's land, 
extracted materials, and placed other materials (silt fencing, hay tubes, grass seed) onto 
Mueller's land, without his permission. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 1014; Tr., Vol. 1, p. 531, L. 4-24). The 
Appellants cannot, in good faith, contend that these activities did not interfere with Mueller's 
exclusive right of possession. Consequently, the District Court's findings are supported by 
substantial evidence. 
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D. The District Court's Finding that the Amount of Material Deposited upon Mueller's 
Property was Substantial is not Clearly Erroneous. 
The Appellants also contend that the District Court erred in finding that the amount of 
material which was deposited upon the Mueller property was substantial. (App. Brief, pp. 21-22). 
The Appellants are simply asking this Court to reweigh the evidence, and substitute its judgment 
for that of the District Court. However, "[t]his Court [is] not [to] substitute its view of the facts 
for that of the trial court." Justad, 147 Idaho at 511. 
The Appellants appear to be taking the position that a party cannot recover damages for a 
trespass unless it quantifies, vvith a mathematical certainty, the amount of trespassing materials 
that have been placed onto that party's property. Not surprisingly, the Appellants fail to provide 
any authority for this contention. 
In fact, there was a substantial amount of evidence admitted at trial which demonstrated 
that a large amount of dirt, rocks, and water were deposited and diverted onto Mueller's property 
through the actions of the Appellants and their contractors. This includes the testimony of 
Mueller (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 58) ("There was tons and tons of rock and my trees buried and 
everything. I mean there was all kinds of debris and everything all do\\n the hillsides."). This 
also includes the testimony of Jack Hester, who provided expert testimony regarding the 
excavation work necessary to restore the Mueller property to it prior condition. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 
398-399) ("I [saw] where a road had been built, material had been moved do\\'Il the hillside, and 
- - and we had water runnin' the wrong directions and more mud moving."). There were also 
pictures admitted at trial which clearly demonstrate that a substantial amount of dirt and that 
were moved onto the Mueller property. The following are just a few of the many pictures 
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admitted at trial which evidence the substantial amount of dirt, rocks, and water which the 
Appellants caused to be moved on Mueller's property: 
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(Ex. 17-C, 17-D, 17-N, 18-C, 18-D, 18-X). 
Finally, upon the stipulation of the parties, District Court Judge Barbara Buchanan 
personally conducted a site visit, and was therefore able to see for herself the condition of the 
property, and the amount of dirt, rocks and water which remained upon the Mueller Property at 
the time of trial as a consequence of the trespass. The District Court's finding that a substantial 
amount of materials had been deposited onto the Mueller property is, therefore, supported by 
substantial evidence. 
E. The District Court's Award of Damages is Not Cleary Erroneous. 
The Appellants next claim that the District Court erred in awarding damages to Mueller. 
Where land is damaged from a trespass, the owner is entitled to recover the amount necessary to 
repair the injury and put the land in the condition it was at the time immediately preceding the 
injury. Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,639,862 P.2d 321,331 (Ct. App. 1993). 
The District Court's determination as to damages is supported by the testimony of expert 
witness Jack Hester, a 53 year resident of Bonner County with 34 years of experience as an 
excavator and owner of an excavation company. At trial, Hester testified that he had provided a 
bid to restore the Mueller property to its prior condition, including an itemization of the costs 
included in the bid. (Ex. 73; Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 395-427). Hester testified, and the District Court 
found, that it would cost $20,000 to remove the fill material that had been deposited on the 
hillside, $1,000 to remove a damaged tree, and $7,500 to have the area reseeded. Thus, the 
Court awarded damages of $28,500, which were reduced by the $5,000 received through 
Mueller's settlement with Buck. (R. Vol. 5. 934-935). 
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Under Idaho law, damages need only be proven by a reasonable certainty. Bumgarner, 
124 Idaho at 640. As explained by the Idaho Court of Appeals: 
"Reasonable certainty" does not require mathematical exactitude, 
but only that the damages be taken out of the realm of speculation. 
The mere fact that it is difficult to arrive at [an] exact amount 
of damages, where it is shown that damages resulted, does not 
mean that damages may not be awarded; it is for the trier-of-
fact to fix the amount. In fixing that amount, it is for the trier of 
fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, to resolve 
conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences 
therefrom. (Internal citations omitted). 
Bumgarner, 124 Idaho at 640. 
The Appellants assert that Hester was "guessing" when he testified as to damages. (App. 
Brief, p. 22). Hester, however, explained that the methodology used by excavators for work of 
this type was a visual inspection, a calculation of the time and materials that the excavator 
believed would be necessary to accomplish the task, followed by a bid. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 397-409). 
This is exactly what he did. (Id.). Moreover, Hester testified that he relied upon the findings of 
Dan Larson, Mueller's civil engineering expert, who provided alternatives for restoring the 
Mueller property to its prior condition. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 401, L. 2-13 ). The Appellants did not 
introduce any testimony to refute Hester's testimony, or testimony as to what they contend 
would be the cost to repair the injury to Mueller's property that was caused by their trespass. 
In fact, Hester included additional work in his bid to restore Mueller's property, which 
the Court considered, but rejected. (Ex. 73). The District Court, weighed Hester's testimony, in 
light of the testimony of the other expert witnesses that testified at trial, and determined that only 
a portion of the repair work would be necessary to restore the Mueller property to its prior 
condition. (R. Vol. 5, p. 934-935). This is a task for which the trial court is uniquely qualified, 
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having been present during the testimony, and being able to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses, and strength of the evidence. The Appellants are asking this Court to second guess 
the determination of the District Court, without any basis to do so. 
The Court's damage award is not clearly erroneous. 
F. The District Court's did not Err in Awarding to Mueller his Costs and Reasonable 
Attorney's Fees. 
The Appellants assert that the District Court erroneously found that: (1) attorneys fees are 
authorized in this case by Idaho Code § 6-202; and (2) Mueller was the prevailing party at trial. 
(App. Brief: pp. 24-25). Neither of these contentions have merit. 
l. The District Court's Found that the Appellants Willfully and Intentionally 
Trespassed Upon the lvfueller Property at a Time when No Trespassing Signs 
were Present; therefore; an Award of Attorney's Fees is Authorized by Idaho 
Code § 6-202. 
The District Court found Mueller to be the prevailing party in this action, and awarded 
costs and fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-202. (R. Vol. 5, p. 936). The Appellants subsequently 
filed a Motion to Reconsider that award, arguing that attorneys fees are not authorized under 
Idaho Code § 6-202, because the District Court found that the Appellants' initial trespass was not 
wanton and intention. (R. Vol. I, pp. 955-964). In rejecting this argument, the District Court 
explained: 
The defendants contend that because the Court did not award the 
plaintiff treble damages under Idaho Code § 6-202, it is precluded 
from awarding the plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 
The Court disagrees. The Court has found that the defendants 
willfully and intentionally entered upon the Mueller property at a 
time when it was posted with "No Trespassing" signs, in violation 
of Idaho Code § 6-202. See Afemorandum Decision, Section III(F). 
The statute provides that, in such instances, in addition to damages, 
the trespasser is liable for reasonable fees and costs. 
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The plaintif-f s real property suffered substantial damage as the 
result of the defendants' trespasses. The Court has declined to 
treble the amount of the actual damages because it has concluded 
that the majority of those damages occurred as the result of the 
earlier trespass, which was more negligent than willful and 
intentional, and occurred before the "No Trespassing signs were 
posted. Idaho Code § 6-202 does not require a finding of any 
particular amount of damages before attorney's fees can be 
awarded. In fact, section 6-202 provides for an award of 
attorney's fees and costs even in those instances where nominal 
damages are proven. 
(R. Vol. 5, p. 1014) (emphasis added). 
This decision is supported by substantial evidence admitted at trial. In 2011, Appellant 
Thompson, ignoring Mueller's explicit written rejection of his request to enter onto his property, 
removed Mueller's no trespassing signs and survey posts, and instructed Woods Crushing & 
Hauling to enter upon the Mueller property and perform excavation work. The contractor then 
entered upon Mueller's property, excavated dirt, and deposited other items (silt fencing, straw 
rounds, seed). (R., Vol. 1, pp. 1014; Tr., Vol. 1, p. 531, L. 4-24). This trespass was without 
question willful and intentional, as found by the District Court. (R., Vol. 5, p. 1010-1011 ). The 
trespass also required the postponement of trial, as the trespass occurred a mere three weeks 
before the then scheduled trial date. Mueller was forced to expend additional monies having his 
experts perform additional inspections of the property, as its condition had been altered by the 
Appellants trespass, and Mueller was forced to incur additional attorney's fees. Consequently, 
Mueller's expert witness costs and attorneys' fees were directly and significantly increased due 
to Thompson's intentional and willful trespass. 
For these reasons, the District Court's award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 
6-202 is supported by substantial evidence. As noted by this Court, "parties who attempt to solve 
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a property dispute through their own forceful action do so at their own peril." Weitz, 148 Idaho at 
864. 
2. The District Court's Finding that Mueller is the Prevailing Party is Supported 
by Substantial Evidence. 
The Appellants also assign error to the District Court's finding that Mueller is the 
prevailing party at trial. (App. Brief, pp. 24-25). A trial court's determination of whether a party 
prevailed is a matter of discretion. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 434-35, 111 P.3d 110, 
119-20 (2005). The boundaries of the district court's discretion are guided by LR.C.P. 
54(d)(l)(B) which provides: "In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and 
entitled to costs, the [district] court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or 
result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties." A trial court's 
determination will not be an abuse of discretion where (1) the district court correctly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion; (2) the district court acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards and (3) the district court reached 
its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 
Idaho 87, 94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
The Appellants' contention that Mueller is not the prevailing party centers on their 
argument that Mueller did not prove each and every cause of action pied in his complaint, and 
was not awarded all of the damages that he sought. Thus, the Defendants are asking the Court to 
perform a claim by claim analysis as to who is the prevailing party. This position is 
fundamentally flawed, as it does not apply the method that the District Court must utilize when 
making a prevailing party analysis. 
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Prior to 2004, the rule required the District Court to determine the prevailing party based 
upon the following factors: 
(1) the final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief 
sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims or issues between 
the parties; and (3) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed 
on each of the claims or issues. 
Sanders v. Lanliford, 134 Idaho 322,325, 1 P.3d 823, 826 (Ct. App. 2000) abrogated by BECO 
Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers Inc., 149 Idaho 294,233 P.3d 1216 (2010). 
The 2004 amendment to Rule 54( d)(l )(B) eliminated the final two factors, so that the rule 
now reads, in relevant part: 
Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a 
prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its 
sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action 
in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial 
court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action 
prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding 
may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair 
and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims 
involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. 
Rather than focusing on whether there were multiple claims, the amended rule is 
intended to encourage a "more global view of the case" in determining who prevailed. See 
Catherine Daerden, Highlights of the 2004 Rule Changes, 47-Jun Advocate (Idaho) 5 (June, 
2004). 1 
1 These criteria also control a court's determination of who is a prevailing party for 
purposes of the award of attorney's fees under statutes which authorize the award of fees to a 
prevailing party. Shurtliffv. Northwest Pools, Inc., 120 Idaho 263 815 P.2d 461 (Ct. App. 1991). 
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In fact, even before the rule was amended, Idaho Appellate Courts had rejected a claim-
by-claim analysis for determining the prevailing party: 
[U]nder modem pleading practice, the plaintiff may advance 
alternative theories relating to an alleged set of facts. Associates 
Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, supra. The trial court should not 
narrowly view each theory as an island of unique facts. Such 
restrictive characterization of theories misconstrues the practice of 
advancing multiple theories, which may only represent different 
ways to obtain one specific recovery-a single claim. Clearly, 
several theories may draw upon a common nucleus of facts 
which give rise to a single claim. 
* * * 
We find that the trial judge improperly viewed the central "claim" 
of the Nalens by narrowly splitting it into prevailing and 
nonprevailing "theories." We hold that when attorney fees are 
allowed under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l), either by statute or contract, the 
amount should not be calculated based upon individual 
prevailing "theories." Rather, the amount should be determined by 
appropriate application of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors. Here, LC. § 
48-608(3) mandates an award of reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing plaintiff. Thus, fees are allowable under Rule 54( e )(1 ). 
The amount is determined by resorting to Rule 54( e )(3) and is not 
to be affected by the ratio of prevailing "theories" to nonprevailing 
"theories." 
Nalen v. Jenkins, 113 Idaho 79, 81-82, 741 P.2d 366 (Ct. App., 1987) (emphasis added). 
If there was any question as to this issue, it is resolved by this Court's decision in 
Eighteen lvfile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 
(2005). In Eighteen lfile, the underlying Plaintiff (Shelby) had sued the Defendant (Nord) both 
individually and as an entity, alleging breach of contract. The Nords counterclaimed, seeking 
$12,000 in compensation for services provided. 
The individual defendants were dismissed either by way of stipulation just prior to trial or 
by motion for directed verdict, with the Nord entity continuing as a Defendant. At the close of a 
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jury trial, the Jury found in favor of Nord, both as a defendant, and on its counterclaim, but only 
awarded it $1,054.38. The District Court subsequently denied Nord's motion for attorney's fees, 
finding that neither party prevailed in the action. Nord appealed the denial of its motion for fees. 
The Eighteen Afile Court overturned the decision of the District Court, and found that 
Nord was the prevailing party in the underlying action. In so finding, the Court noted: 
In determining which party prevailed where there are claims and 
counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who 
prevailed "in the action"; that is, the prevailing party question is 
examined and determined from an overall view, not a claim-by-
claim analysis. 
Viewing its success from an overall standpoint, Nord Excavating 
was a prevailing party. In ruling it was not, the district court 
focused too much attention on the Company's less than 
tremendous success on its counterclaim and seemingly ignored 
the fact that the Company avoided all liability as a defendant. 
The district court improperly undervalued the Company's 
successful defense. A voiding liability is a significant benefit to a 
defendant. In baseball, it is said that a walk is as good as a hit. The 
latter, of course, is more exciting. In litigation, avoiding liability is 
as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a 
plaintiff. The point is, while a plaintiff with a large money 
judgment may be more exalted than a defendant who simply walks 
out of court no worse for the wear, courts must not ignore the value 
of a successful defense. In this case, logic suggests that a verdict 
in Nord Excavating's favor and a victory on its counterclaim 
(albeit, a relatively small one), by definition, makes it a 
prevailing party. 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, 141 Idaho at 719. (emphasis added). 
This is precisely the case here. Mueller avoided all liability on the Defendants counter-
claims, including their attempt to quiet title in Mueller's property, and for damages against 
Mueller for allegedly shooting one of the Defendant's dogs. As such, there can be little doubt 
that Mueller is the prevailing party herein. 
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The simple fact that Mueller did not prevail on his claims of encroachment and 
negligence, which are merely alternative theories of the trespass claim, does not preclude a 
finding that Mueller is the prevailing party when the case is viewed in a global sense, as is 
required under current law. 
\\lhere, as here, there are claims, counterclaims and cross-claims, 
the mere fact that a party is successful in asserting or defeating a 
single claim does not mandate an award of fees to the prevailing 
party on that claim. The rule does not require that. It mandates an 
award of fees only to the party or parties who prevail "in the 
action." 
Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687,693,682 P2d 640 (Ct.App.1984). 
The question before the District Court, therefore, was not which party prevailed on which 
claim, but which party prevailed in the case. The District Court found that: 
[T]he fundamental issue in the Complaint was whether the 
defendants trespassed upon the upon the Mueller property. The 
trespass claim is the gravamen of this action, and the plaintiff 
prevailed on that claim. Although the plaintiff was not awarded all 
the damages he requested, with this expert's testimony at trial, he 
successfully proved $23,500 in damages. Meanwhile the 
defendants abandoned their counterclaims. 
(R. Vol. 5, p. 1013). 
In asserting that Mueller is not the prevailing party, the Appellants also failed to give any 
weight to Mueller's successful defense against the Appellants' counter-claims. Both a party's 
successes in bringing claims and in defending against them are important to the prevailing party 
analysis. See Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540, 546, 272 P.3d 512, 
518 (2012). In Oakes, the Idaho Supreme Court looked at whether the plaintiff was successful in 
his breach of contract claim, which was the fundamental issue of his complaint. Although the 
plaintiff did not succeed on his ancillary wage claim and only received 10% of what he sought 
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under his breach of contract claim, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the district court abused 
its discretion by declining to find the plaintiff to be the prevailing party when he had successfully 
defended against the respondent's counterclaim and received a final judgment in his favor. Id. 
In both Oakes and Eighteen A1ile Ranch, this Court held that the district court abused its 
discretion by undervaluing the successful defense of a claim or counterclaim and deciding that 
neither party prevailed overall. In this case, Mueller avoided all liability on the Defendants' 
counterclaims, and also prevailed on his claim of trespass, which was the primary claim at issue 
in this case. Moreover, Mueller's victory was not pyrrhic, as Mueller's award was for more than 
a nominal amount. Merely because Mueller did not obtain every penny that he was seeking does 
not justify a finding that he was not the prevailing party. Oakes, 152 Idaho at 546 (finding that 
the District Court abused its discretion by finding that the Plaintiff was not the prevailing party, 
where the Plaintiff had won $2,043.92, after seeking $25,171.69, and defending against counter-
claims); Eighteen 1'1file Ranch (Overturning a finding that there was no prevailing party, where 
Defendants successfully defended against claims, and were awarded $1,054.38 in damages for a 
counterclaim in which Defendants sought $12,000.00); see also Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 
777, 203 P.3d 702, 707 (2009) (Upholding finding that plaintiff was prevailing party even 
though the plaintiff recovered substantially less than the amount sought, in part because the 
plaintiff successfully defended against the defendant's counterclaims). 
Mueller respectfully submits that the court should uphold the District Court's finding that 
Mueller is the prevailing party herein. 
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G. The District Court's Finding that All of the Defendants are Liable is not Clearly 
Erroneous. 
The Appellants' final contention is that the District Court erred in finding that Appellants 
Carolyn Hill and Philomena Keys were liable. (App. Brief., pp. 25-26). The District Court found 
that, "At all times during the road construction work, Kevin Thompson was acting on behalf of 
himself, Carolyn Hill, Philomena Keys, and Northwest Shelter Systems, LLC." (R., Vol. 5, p. 
927, 116). This finding is supported by substantial evidence admitted at trial. 
In fact, the Appellants admit in their verified Answer & Counterclaim that "In 2008 and 
2009 the Defendants commenced repair work on the Subject Road." (R. Vol. 1, p. 67, ,r 8) 
(emphasis added). The Appellants confirmed and clarified their involvement in their Answer to 
the Second Amended Complaint and Amended Counterclaims, in which they admit that "In 2008 
and 2009, the Defendants Hill, Thompson, and Keys commenced repair work on the existing 
Subject Road." (R. Vol. 3, p. 533) (emphasis added). When asked at trial about this admission, 
Appellant Thompson confirmed that it is correct, and stated, "I still feel that way today." (Tr., 
Vol. I, pp. 503). This admission alone is sufficient evidence to support the District Court's 
finding. However, additional evidence to this effect was admitted at trial. 
Appellant Carolyn Hill is the sister of Appellant Kevin Thompson, and she owns and 
resides at the property upon which the road work was completed, and therefore, owns the road 
itself. (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 459). Thompson had Hill's permission to perform the road work on Hill's 
property, which includes both blasting and excavating. (Ex. 77, p. 23, 11. 21-25). It is through Ms. 
Hill's property that the other Appellants access their property. In Hill's deposition, which was 
admitted at trial as Exhibit 77, she admitted that she was aware of the road work, and was 
witness to the blasting (Ex. 77, pp. 24-26, 31 ). Ms. Hill admits to having seen Mueller's no 
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trespassing signs. (Ex. 77, p. 31). She admits to being aware of the work done by Woods 
Crushing and Hauling in 2011. (Ex. 77, pp. 40-41). 
As to Philomena Keys, she is the only titled owner of the Keys/Thompson parcel. (Ex. 8). 
It is unclear why Thompson's name was not included on the deed through which he and his wife, 
Philomena Keys, acquired the property, but it clear that the expansion of the road directly 
benefitted Keys' property. 
Evidence at trial also demonstrated that Thompson was acting as an agent for both his 
wife, and his marital community. When asked if the decision to improve the road was a family 
decision, Thompson first answered, "That's correct." (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 501-502). He then stated, 
"It's a decision I made as head of the household." (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 502). This confirms that the 
trespass committed by Thompson and his contractors was done on behalf of himself, and 
Philomena Keys. 
Finally, evidence admitted at trial demonstrated that Philomena Keys herself performed 
some of the road work. George Thompson, the Woods Crushing and Hauling employee who 
performed the bulldozer work in 2008, and who testified on behalf of the Appellants, personally 
witnessed Ms. Keys operating heavy equipment, as he explained at trial: 
Q. Did you see anybody doing work out there besides you? 
A. Kevin [Thompson] had a cat out there. I seen them doin' 
some work. 
Q. When you say "them," what do you mean? Did you see Mr. 
Thompson operate the cat? 
A. I seen - actually, I don't know if I ever seen him run it. I 
seen his wife run it. 
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Q. You saw his wife run it. Did you see anybody else running 
his cat? 
A. I don't think that. I think she's the only one I ever seen 
runnin it. 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 573, L. 11-21). 
The District Court's determination that all of the Appellants, including Hill and Keys, are 
liable for the trespass is supported by substantial evidence and is therefore not clearly erroneous. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
For the foregoing reasons, Mueller respectfully submits that the decision of the District 
Court be affirmed. 
V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Mueller seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal against the Appellants pursuant to 
Idaho Code§§ 6-202 and/or 12-121, Rule 54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and/or 
Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DA TED this 1 ;th day of July, 2014. 
Afy· I . 
/ · . T~ ~cLaughlin 
- fitlomeys for Respondent Mueller 
/ 
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